As we talked about in our previous Airline Anchluss column, Lufthansa is in an interesting position in the European market at the moment.  With the new deal of Austrian Airlines moving ahead, they are well positioned to take advantage of the market once the recession crisis is over.   In the interim, they are in an excellent position to execute on their longer term strategies.  One of those strategies is what to do with bmi, which we will explore hypothetically in this post.   First, however, lets have a look at the latest earning reports.

 

The Latest on Earnings

 

This week Lufthansa reported a net loss of €265 MM compared with a restated profit of €44 MM from a year earlier. Hit hard in the past year has been the cargo business, as well as the other ancillary aviation businesses that Lufthansa’s has a stake in.  Specifically, we feel that as their airline customers look for cost savings of their own in areas like catering and handling where Lufthansa has significant global holdings. Click here for quick view of Lufthansa’s holdings in a .pdf format. (please note that this opens in a new window, and is in German.)

 

 The real bad news was that the deficit was wider than the €180 MM loss estimates that were coming from leading industry analysts.    

 There are few people who cover this sector better than Holly Hegeman of www.planebusiness.com.  

 

To quote Ms. Hegemann, ,  “Lufthansa reiterated that it will report “clearly positive” operating profit for the year, albeit with a “considerable” decline from 1.35 billion euros in 2008.

 

First quarter revenue fell 11% to 5 billion euros. The operating loss was 44 million euros compared with operating profit of 172 million euros the year before.”

 

 The tangled web that is Lufthansa

 

In our previous blog, Airline Anchluss, we went over the details of the Lufthansa/Austrian deal, and how that single deal could impact aviation in Western Europe.   In today’s instalment we want to take a broader look at Lufthansa ownership of British Midland, or bmi, and what implications that may have for the commercial aviation market in the EU.

 The fate of Heathrow’s Second Largest Airline is basically in Lufthansa’s hands

 

Sir Michael Bishop, the long-time Chief Executive of bmi agreed last year to sell a majority share of the carrier to Lufthansa.

 

Currently the bulk of the remaining shares are with Scandinavian Airlines (The SAS Group), which  is undertaking a painful reorganisation, focusing on freeing cash from assets such as its interests in Spanair, and its 20% stake in bmi.

 

Earlier this year Sir Richard Branson has “confirmed” his interest aquiring bmi, as it would allow him to create the short haul networks in Europe that have strategic value.  Since that first comfirmation, however, neither Virgin or Lufthansa have made any public comment.

 

So what is going on with bmi today?

 

bmi has had some changes in key management positions, this year, including a new the head of Marketing Katherine Gershon and new VP of Operations Martyn Bridger, both formerly of the British all-business class carrier Silverjet.    While Gershon has managed to begin to change the way people may thing about the carrier through a revised website and new ad campaign, we don’t see the revenue numbers reflecting a return on the new marketing budget. bmi has made some shrewd operational changes including new markets in the Middle East, Israel, and Russia while also cutting some domestic routes. 

 

bmi is also remained a member of STAR Alliance and coordinates with its other airline partners in the alliance.

 

So the stage is set, and you can begin to see why Lufthansa’s position is an enviable one.  Through long term strategic investment they have managed to now successfully gain majority control of London Heathrow’s second largest airline.   When you take a look at the strength and breadth of the airline holdings that Lufthansa has built you can be forgiven for thinking that Lufthansa has spun one of the strongest webs in modern airline history.

 

The Lufthansa “Fantasy Playbook” for bmi

 

With the Austrian Airlines deal seeming settled, it become interesting to thing about the commercial opportunities that bmi offers Lufthansa, particularly if it were to pick up the SAS share.

 

So we took out our numbers and began to look into our airline crystal ball (which as you all know comes without warranty for all but a glimpse of 1 hour into the future of aviation.)  None-the-less we stated to play Fantasy LH Boardroom.

With that we have come up with four potential scenarios:

One: If it is not broke then don’t fix it.  In our view, however, bmi is not poised to do anything unique in the market that Lufthansa could not do better, and more cost-efficiently, themselves.

 

Two: Keep bmi as they do Swiss, Germanwings, Lufthansa Italia and Austrian- as separate entities under their wing but with a shuffle of the boardroom chairs.

 

Three: Acquire the whole of bmi and promptly sell it off to a willing buyer with cash.  Logically this would be either BA or The Virgin Group, both of which are a little cash strapped at the moment.  We don’t see this happening, as the value to Lufthansa would be too great to simply sell, unless it began to desperately need the cash.  Well in the frame for interest in bmiBaby and bmiregional could be another regional player in the UK: Flybe.  This is a rumour that they strongly deny as ”pure industry rumour.” 

 

Four /Step One: Do nothing at the moment, but leverage bmi Heathrow real estate for an assault on lucrative London trans-Atlantic traffic when the numbers, especially business class numbers, begin to improve.

 

Four/ Step Two: Having taken the cream Heathrow slots for Lufthansa metal to begin taking London transatlantic market share, they could then move the focus of short haul operations to Dublin’s new terminal two building and take on Aer Lingus (if they are still around) and Ryanair.  In essence give Irish consumers a true choice from Ireland that has some service that might wine and dine passengers rather than nickel-and-diming them.   Obviously some rebranding may be required, as bmi may not sell as well as say Lufthansa Eire.

 

Would they be cannibalising their own traffic?

 

The short answer is that we do not think that they would be losing much of their trans-Atlantic loyalty from their German operations by doing setting up direct London-US routes.   Taking into account the new Swiss product offering, our estimates were less than 4% of Lufthansa and Swiss London traffic connecting across the Atlantic.  

We credit most of the up to their PrivatAir agreements, strong demand out of London City,  and a few hard to reach non-stop jewels like Portland (PDX) and Seattle which are smart bets for a busy business traveller.

 

If they were to try focus on Ireland, we believe that they could gain a significant competitive advantage by feeding Westbound Asian traffic through Frankfurt, Zurich, and Munich, while at the same time serving the Ireland-UK market at a decent profit.

 

So what are your thoughts on the subject?

 

We would love to hear your thoughts on the subject, and what you think may or may not happen in the scenarios discussed in this article.   Do you have any alternate theories?  So you think our numbers are out of the park?   Or do you think we might be on to something?    We look forward to your comments!

Disclosure: The author does not maintain any positions or contracts with the airlines and companies mentioned in this blog.

 

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Plane Business Banter at www.planebusiness.com

THE ISSUE – A FAILED BID FOR ANTITRUST IMMUNITY

 

In 2002, American Airlines (AA) and British Airways (BA) filed for antitrust immunity. Had their request been approved, they would have been free to work together to set more competitive flight schedules and fares. Unfortunately for the two airlines, no agreement has yet been reached with the US and EU regulatory authorities.

The question is: are consumers losing out as a result?

THE BACKGROUND – A LOT HAS CHANGED SINCE 2002

 

Back in 2002, the landscape of the EU-US airline market was very different. New entrants to the market were prohibited, and AA and BA practically had a monopoly hold on daily departures between London Heathrow and the US.

The new EU-US Open Skies accord has changed all that. Since the first phase of this agreement was reached in 2007, the doors have been opened for new market entrants to fundamentally change the competitive landscape at Heathrow and other European airports. Airlines such as Air France, Delta, US Airways and Northwest have begun to challenge established Heathrow-US carriers: an example of the healthy competition that comes from open markets.

ARGUMENTS FOR – MORE CHOICE FOR CONSUMERS

Ultimately, passengers now have a wider choice of carriers, service levels and new non-stop destinations than ever before. 

Plus, there is now a serious potential contender in the London-US market. Heathrow’s second largest airline BMI has been raising its profile to business travellers over the past few months, while Lufthansa has recently increased its stake in the airline.  So, could direct links to the US be far off for BMI, giving consumers even more choice when it comes to transatlantic flights?

 

Notably, both BMI and Lufthansa are members of the Star Alliance, which already operates with antitrust immunity and as a result is growing stronger and more competitive by the day. In all this, the consumer is once again the winner.

 

ARGUMENTS AGAINST – THE IMPACT ON GATWICK AND COULD BA/AA ‘MONOPOLY’ INFLATE FARES?

 

The past few years have seen other London airports such as Stansted and Luton experiment with transatlantic links – with mixed results. And in the wake of Open Skies, a near ‘mass Exodus’ of carriers shifting their operations to Heathrow has led to radical changes at Gatwick. These changes could, in fact, continue – but in new direction. If Virgin Atlantic wins its bid to buy the airport from the British Aviation Authority, it could potentially shift consumer preference away from Heathrow with a superior airport experience.

 

Unsurprisingly, it is competitors such as Virgin Atlantic that most strongly oppose the BA/AA bid for antitrust immunity. Along with several consumer groups, Virgin Atlantic claims that the result would be a ‘stranglehold’ on Heathrow-US services,  which would enable BA and AA to coordinate schedules enough to inflate demand and therefore fares.

 

OUR CONCLUSION – AA/BA ANTITRUST IMMUNITY MAKES SENSE

 

While antitrust immunity could arguably have some impact on frequency and schedules as BA and AA coordinate their services, consumer demand and pressure from new competitors will help keep fares in check. Most importantly, it will give passengers an alternative choice of carriers on a scale not previously available.

 

So, overall, we feel there is no cogent argument for opposing the AA/BA request for antitrust immunity: a request that has been granted to many other alliances in Europe and the US. Its approval can only help to level the playing field between airline alliances, increase competitive pressures – and ultimately benefit consumers.

 

It is therefore in all our interests to urge lawmakers to approve the BA/AA application sooner rather than later.